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The morality of what we owe to each other is a matter of principles that no 
one could reasonably reject-if we were all concerned to agree on what sort of 
conduct to allow or disallow. We care about it deeply, because we want to be 
able to justify what we do to others on a basis that they could not reasonably 
reject. I find this an immensely appealing moral ideal, and find Scanlon’s 
explanation of its appeal plausible and illuminating. What We Owe to Each 
Other is a wonderful book full of deep and extended argument. No brief explo- 
ration could begin to do it justice, but I will touch on a few questions the 
book raises for me. 
Reasons 
Scanlon and I agree, for the most part, about the concept of a reason, though 
Scanlon speaks as a normative “realist”, whereas I have called my own posi- 
tion a form of non-cognitivism. Scanlon is not a full-blown Platonist, for 
talk of a non-natural realm of reasons that we can intuit does not, on his 
view, do anything to explain reasons and our awareness of them. Still, apart 
from this, Scanlon’s view of the concept of a reason may not be all that dif- 
ferent from Moore’s view of the concept of good. 
On my own view likewise, if we look for a straight analysis of the con- 
cept of a reason, we will find none that works. I mean the concept of a reason 
to do something, as when I say that the health effects and addictiveness of 
smoking are reasons not to take it up. I don’t mean the psychological concept 
of an “operative reason”, as Scanlon calls it, a person‘s reason for doing what 
she does, as in “Her reason for taking up smoking was that it would freak out 
her parents;” saying this doesn’t commit us to thinking that that’s any reason 
at all to take up smoking. Now for this normative concept of a reason to do 
something, I agree with Scanlon: we can’t do better than he does by way of 
straight analysis; we can only say, somewhat uninformatively, that to be a 
reason to do something is to count in favor of doing it. On much the grounds 
he lays out, for instance, we can‘t translate talk of reasons into psychological 
claims about preferences or desires. 
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Still, just to leave matters at that, it seems to me, is to leave them myste- 
rious. What is this notion of a consideration’s “counting in favor” of an act? 
What are we claiming when we say such a thing? To be sure, even with no 
further explanation, I would go on using the notion of a reason, but it should 
leave me worried; I would be clinging to something 1 couldn’t explain. 
We can do better. Picture thinking what to do; consider it psychologically. 
I decide whether to eat the ice cream by weighing considerations for and 
against-uick enjoyment against later health, say. This concept of weighing 
is psychological; we know what it is for a person to weigh enjoyment in 
favor of eating. We can even think how a robot could be constructed to 
mimic such a process of weighing considerations and acting on the results. If 
we found another robot whose movements were shaped by a natural selection 
algorithm, we can comprehend what sorts of results would constitute, in  
effect, its weighing a consideration in favor of something. This concept of 
weighing is psychological and naturalistic. 
Now the non-naturalist offers this much by way of explaining this psy- 
chology. In the first place, we have the general notion of a belief. Second, we 
have the concept of being a reason to do something, or counting in favor of 
doing it, a concept we understand but can’t explain. To describe the person 
who deliberates, then, simply put these notions together: he believes that 
pleasure counts in favor of things and chances of death count against and 
count more. Now I do not reject this, but putting matters this way leaves 
room for questions we recognize as nonsensical, questions that have no 
answer except, “That’s brutely the way things are.” What is this quality of 
counting in favor, “out there” independently of who favors it and why? Why 
do whatever there’s most reason to do? Why does this particular belief, that 
there’s most “reason” to do so-and-so, play such a central role in action? Sup- 
pose an unfamiliar word had been used for all this, with no more explanation 
than we have given for reasons; we would be mystified. We could look at 
examples-but what would we recognize in them? Is the thing about reasons 
just that we know them when we see them, as with yellow? What is the 
peculiar attraction of reasons? 
To understand what’s going on with reasons, we should supplement this 
empty straight mode of explanation with an explanation of psychic role. 
Realize that deliberation will mimic a process of checking various facts and 
toting up scores in columns labeled with the names of alternatives, and then 
taking the alternative with the highest total. That’s the psychic process of 
weighing considerations for and against. Not that all deliberation takes this 
simple weighing form, but start with the ones that do. What, then, of a per- 
son who found the notion of such a reason mysterious? At the end of this 
explanation, an explanation that begins with the psychic process of one’s 
weighing a consideration for or against, we could say this to him: If you 
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deliberate in this way, then you already believe certain things to be reasons 
for and against. You already know what it is to have such beliefs. And you 
can see that anyone who deliberates will form such beliefs. There’s no more 
to believing something to be a reason than that-and it is a kind of belief 
that no one could renounce and still deliberate.’ 
To read Scanlon is to join him in thinking how to live a human life, and 
why. Pondering these matters is inescapable, a part of any normal human 
life-though pushing the demands of such thinking to philosophical 
extremes is avoidable enough. Thinking far or feebly on how to live, we Q 
best to put our heads together, and to do that is to join each other in norma- 
tive discussion. Scanlon engages us in an intricate inquiry into what con- 
straints to accept and to demand for living together, for what reasons. How- 
ever much he gets right or wrong, his project is intelligible and of central 
importance. 
Reasonable Rejection 
With Scanlon we search for a background rationale for morality. Utilitarians, 
many Kantians, and some kinds of contractarians hope for a full rationale, 
formulated in nonmoral terms, from which more everyday precepts, which- 
ever of them we should retain, can be drawn. Such a base level rationale is 
not Scanlon’s ambition: He explains moral right and wrong only in terms of 
other morally charged notions. He relies on the notion of “reasonable rejec- 
tion”, and so a crucial puzzle is how much explanation we gain from this 
notion. One aspect of the puzzle is this: Scanlon uses his characterization of 
wrongness to argue that certain kinds of acts are wrong. To the extent that his 
conclusions agree with our considered judgements, these arguments can be 
seen as confirming his diagnosis of the morality of what we owe to each 
other. But Scanlon’s derivations do not pretend to be algorithmic; he enjoys 
great freedom in the morally charged considerations he can draw on. Much 
rests on appeals to intuitive judgments of reasonableness. As Scanlon well 
realizes, then, a reader must worry about whether the derivations are fudged, 
whether considerations about reasonable rejection of principles let us derive 
conclusions about right and wrong just by drawing their plausibility from 
what we already think about right and wrong. 
Consider a stock scenario: We settle a new land, and arrange a division of 
the land that we ranch. This division is fair: no one can reasonably reject it. It 
’ I treat the concept of a reason in Wise Choices, Apr Feelings (1990). pp. 160-164. To call 
R a reason to do X, I say, is to express one’s “acceptance of norms that say to treat R as 
weighing in favor of doing x”’ (163). Scanlon discusses this (58): Nonnative reasons are 
beliefs, he maintains, and I am now happy to agree. Scanlon worries that to explain the 
concept of a reason, I appeal, in effect, to his own, normative notion of “counting in 
favor”. But I intended my words “to treat R as weighing in favor of doing X,” in the 
psychological sense I have been expounding. 
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is wrong, then, in the course of ranching, to violate the rules of property that 
this division sets up. Then oil is found under the land, offering far more 
wealth than can ranching in this country. The oil is under some ranches and 
not under others. Two possible sets of principles are now salient: Those with 
oil under their land say that rights to the oil go with their rights to ranch. 
That’s sheer luck, they agree, but it’s the way the rights of the matter happen 
to have worked out. Others say that the initial division wasn’t with an eye to 
oil, and all are equally entitled to the unexpected benefits. What then do they 
owe to each other? 
This is a classic bargaining situation in moral guise. Two arrangements 
are proposed: “to each his own” and equal sharing. If these are the only alter- 
natives, then presumably, at most one side can be reasonable here in rejecting 
the arrangement less to its advantage-but which? If more alternatives come 
into play, there will still be an “efficiency frontier” on which anyone’s gain is 
someone else’s loss, and so like questions still arise. Here if anywhere, we 
might think, thoughts of reasonable rejection can help us to sort through the 
rights and wrongs. But how? 
I can reasonably reject a set of principles, perhaps, just in case they allow 
me less than my due, if they impose excessive burdens on me in light of the 
burdens they impose on others or fail to demand enough of others on my 
behalf. So the question boils down to whether the oil is due to the lucky or 
due to all. But to say this seems to leave us asking directly what the rights 
and wrongs of the case are. I reasonably reject a set of principles, perhaps, if 
it burdens me by disallowing acts of mine that aren’t wrong, or by allowing 
acts of others that are wrong, to my disadvantage in comparison to a just 
alternative. The just alternative is the one that disallows all and only acts that 
are wrong. All this, however, is to characterize “reasonable” rejection in 
terms of wrongness. Can thoughts of what’s reasonable play a more inde- 
pendent role than this? 
This is a question that Scanlon keeps addressing, and perhaps it can be 
answered only by considering his many particular arguments. This I won’t 
attempt; instead, I move to a more specific worry. 
Scanlon distinguishes narrow morality, in the sense of what we owe to 
each other, from broader ways in which we may reasonably want certain kinds 
of acts not to be performed. The brutality of bear-baiting isn’t in the realm of 
what we owe to bears, and it isn’t fully explained by considerations of what 
we owe to each other. Likewise for some of the waste of failing to develop 
one’s talents. And for some realms that are central to “morality” as the term 
is widely used, such as sexual “morality”, the story is complex: there’s no 
reason to be appalled, say, by sodomy as such, and rape is of course a seri- 
ous, narrowly moral wrong, a deep violation of what we owe to each other. 
Some ways of approaching sex, though, are dismaying without being of nar- 
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rowly moral concern, a matter of what we owe to each other. These distinc- 
tions that Scanlon draws seem right to me. I want to explore, though, 
whether they fall out of Scanlon’s system, and what kinds of resources we 
need in order to make these distinctions. 
Suppose someone stands ready to reject any code whatsoever that allows 
bear-baiting. Then unless this stance is unreasonable, it follows that bear- 
baiting is wrong-in the narrowly moral sense. For there’s then no univer- 
sally unrejectable code that permits bear-baiting. And so if brutality of bear- 
baiting isn‘t a narrow wrong, in the sense of violating what we owe to each 
other, we’ll need some account of why such rejection is unreasonable. Scan- 
lon does discuss such issues, but as far as I can see, he rules out such rejec- 
tion simply as not a matter of what we owe to each other. “I do no wrong to 
anyone” is one of his explanations of why I can’t reasonably reject a principle 
(219-220). The exclusion of important values from the realm of what we owe 
to each other, then, doesn’t fall out of the contractual theory; rather, the inter- 
pretation of contractual theory rests on a prior understanding of what falls 
under what we owe to each other. The same will go for failing to develop 
one‘s talents. Why can’t someone reasonably reject allowing this? Scanlon 
regards it as one of the attractions of his theory that “all objections must be 
raised by individuals” (230). What, though, of objections that could be raised 
by an individual, but not on her own behalf. 
There ought to be an answer, I agree, but I don’t know how to draw it 
from Scanlon’s contractual apparatus. We can reasonably reject principles 
allowing bear-baiting, I’d think, on behalf of the bears that would be baited. 
Indeed it looks as if what is needed in all these cases is to say that “reasonable 
rejection” is to be understood, in Scanlon’s definition, as rejection that is 
both reasonable and on one’s own behalf. If I reject bear-baiting, it isn’t on 
my own behalf, and so its wrongness is not a matter of what we owe to each 
other. Scanlon himself rules out impersonal reasons for rejecting principles; 
but is this a consequence of his general contractualist formulation? 
Scanlon might also have asked what agreeing to “allow” or “disallow” an 
action amounts to. If the force of “disallowing” something is that, costlessly, 
no one will ever do it, then we have reason to want such vices as smoking, 
the waste of talents, and the cheapening of the precious disallowed. If the 
force of “disallowing” is to turn sanctions of guilt and resentment on such 
acts, then we might not have sufficient reason to want these things dis- 
allowed, because the cure is worse than the disease. This is the kind of 
consideration that utilitarians bring to bear, as with Mill, and it looks as if 
they should be available to Scanlon. But he himself discusses such a p  
proaches only to reject them. I myself would insist that rejection is terribly 
unreasonable if it ignores the broad benefits and costs of alternative systems 
of allowing and disallowing. To ignore the psychic cost of a moral system is 
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to treat human suffering cavalierly. I hope that Scanlon’s formula is properly 
interpreted as taking such costs and benefits seriously. 
To distinguish the realm that Scanlon is marking out, it thus seems, the 
concept we need is this: reasonably rejecting a code on one’s own behalf, or 
for reasons that are personal. This concept may not fit smoothly into Scan- 
lon’s project. His Chapter 3 is a marvelously crafted critique of any uniform 
notion of a person’s good or a person’s self-interest. No one concept, he 
argues, can meet all the demands placed on a notion of a person’s interests. 
One of these demands is to mark out which considerations one can legiti- 
mately claim to have counted morally on one’s behalf. This, however, is 
something that must emerge from a moral theory; it can’t be a starting point 
for moral theorizing. We have now seen, however, that what counts as the 
right kind of rejection of a code, be it reasonable or not, depends on the 
notion of an objection on one‘s own behalf. This doesn’t just emerge from 
the theory, but is a crucial ingredient 
Contractualism and Bargaining Theory 
Contractarianism comes in a family of versions that Scanlon distinguishes 
from his own “contractualism”. In a form that draws heavily fr?m econe 
mists‘ bargaining theory, these theories propose something like this: stan- 
dards of justice and of right and wrong are the ones that would be agreed to in 
fair circumstances. Scanlon himself rejects such contractarianism at least in 
part because he rejects its notion of utility, a person’s good on a unidimen- 
sional scale. Scanlon does, if I am right, need a notion of reason to prefer on 
one‘s own behalf, but whether this can be placed on a unidimensional scale is 
a question far beyond the scope of a quick treatment. We can ask, though, 
whether Scanlon’s differences from “contractarianism” proceed entirely from 
this difference on the formal properties of one’s most fundamental reasons for 
policy. 
Standard bargaining theory proceeds in terms of what one has reason to 
insist on, in the face of others’ acting on their own reasons to insist other- 
wise, and given everyone’s reasons for prefemng various agreements to none 
at all. Is this Scanlon’s picture? Not as he applies his method, certainly. His 
discussion of aggregating the costs and benefits of different people, for 
instance, studiously ignores all questions of ex ante appeal of different possi- 
ble social arrangements, of reasons to prefer before knowing who occupies 
which position (229-241). This kind of thing is meat and drink to some 
important economics-inspired social arguments. Scanlon’s own arguments 
rest instead, to a substantial degree, on direct intuitions of what are acceptable 
arrangements. But is he constructing a system that within which he should be 
taking such economic style arguments seriously? 
174 ALLAN GIBBARD 
Much will hinge on what the term ‘reasonable’ means. On one reading, we 
can explain something’s being reasonable in terms of a general notion of 
reasons-valid reasons to do something. What‘s reasonable is perhaps what’s 
most supported by reasons. Or, Scanlon suggests, it‘s a matter of what’s sup- 
ported by reasons within a contextually determined range. For purposes of 
“reasonable rejection”, these might be reasons to prefer one code to another 
on one’s own behalf, together with reasons to come to agreement with others 
similarly motivated. If this is the right reading, it looks much like a realiza- 
tion of standard bargaining theory, where parties are presumed to be moved by 
reasons of this kind. The ex ante appeal of social and moral arrangements 
should matter then greatly; how close this would bring Scanlon to utilitarian- 
ism is a large question. 
Another suggestion of the term “reasonable”, though, is morally laden 
from the start; Rawls’s use of the term plays on this suggestion. If I am less 
accommodating than I should be, then I am being “unreasonable”, whereas if 
I am more accommodating-even if I am bargaining with the devil on behalf 
of the forces of good-we wouldn’t normally say that I’m being unreasonable. 
We might instead say I’m being “more than reasonable”.’ Scanlon sometimes 
says that moral force is built into the word ‘reasonable’ as he is using it, and 
his appeals to the notion are not always attempts to demonstrate that one’s 
reasons on one’s own behalf and reasons to reach accommodation work on 
their own to produce the outcome Scanlon derives. Sometimes what he 
appeals to is that a principle is unfair, that it singles others out, without jus- 
tification, for privileged status (217). 
At the start of the book, Scanlon introduces the idea of reasonableness in a 
way that fits the first sense, as responsiveness to a range of reasons, such as 
those grounded in other peoples’ interests. With talk of reasonable rejection, 
“What we are claiming is that there is reason to take these interests into 
account given the supposed aim of reaching agreement ...” (33). If this is 
what he means by the term when he gets to applying it, however, we need 
more explanation. That rejection is reasonable, Scanlon now tells us, “is a 
judgment with moral content” (217). Since this content grounds the entire 
system, we need to understand what it is. Scanlon is right, I am convinced, 
about a crucial source of moral concern. Whether identifying this source of 
concern has helped us settle the shape and content of moral demands is a ques- 
tion I find puzzling. 
* 1 owe this observation to Brian Hooks. 
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